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Monitoring Political Independence of Public Service Media: Comparative 
Analysis across 19 European Union Member States
1
 
 
This paper examines risks for political independence of public service media in European 
Union Member States by examining legal safeguards for guaranteeing independence of public 
service media’s governance and its funding mechanisms, and also the extent to which these 
are implemented. The analysis was conducted in 19 EU countries through a questionnaire-
based method. The questionnaire was completed by a local team consisting of national media 
scholars. Results point to differences in media policies concerned with PSM’s independence 
among EU countries, with many risks associated with these policies and their implementation. 
Specifically, significant risk for PSM’s political independence has been identified in more 
than half of the EU Member States included in the sample (n=11), most of these being 
countries of Southern and Central Eastern Europe.   
 
Keywords: comparative analysis; public service media; European Union; political 
independence; risk 
 
Introduction 
When Polish President Andrzej Duda in early 2016 signed the new media law, which allows 
the government to appoint and dismiss public service broadcaster’s management boards, the 
importance of public service media’s political independence was once again raised on the 
public agenda. Many organisations concerned with media pluralism and media freedom 
reacted to this development, including International Federation of Journalists, European 
Association of Journalists, Council of Europe, and European Commission, urging Polish 
political elite to abolish the direct governmental control over its public service media. In 
these discussions, the value of the independent PSM has been repeatedly emphasised, 
2 
 
particularly its contribution to democratic and societal processes. What this case illustrates is 
that the public service media in Europe continues to be considered the “cornerstone of 
democracy” (Bardoel and dHaensen, 2008: 350), but also that European countries still face 
the challenge of securing independence from political influences, as The Council of Europe 
recognized in their Recommendation to Member States on public service media governance 
(2012) several years before developments in Poland.  
 Previous comparative research has identified PSM systems in countries of Southern 
and Central Eastern Europe as those particularly prone to political influences, while those in 
North Western Europe have in the past usually been evaluated as politically independent  
(Brogi and Dobreva, 2015; European Media Systems Survey, 2010; Hallin and Mancini, 
2004). However, as the Polish case illustrates, media legislation in Europe seems to be in 
constant flux. Also, perhaps more worryingly, these legislative changes, related to primarily 
Central Eastern European countries, over the past few years seem to be aimed at allowing 
political elites stronger hold of PSM, rather than decreasing the level of state intervention in it 
(Mijatović, 2016).  
This paper aims to contribute to the monitoring of the political independence of PSM 
systems in Europe by examining media policies, and the ways in which these are 
implemented, related to safeguarding political independence of public service media across 
19 Member States of the European Union. Accordingly, the main research question which the 
paper aims to address is: At what kinds of risks from the influences of the state are public 
service media in the European Union? 
The risks from state influence are examined through the analysis of two mechanisms, 
PSM funding and management. Specifically, in order to assess the risks from PSM funding 
this study analyses the media policies guiding the process of financing PSM, as well as the 
ways in which these are implemented, and the extent to which the PSM is funded by direct 
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government grants. With regards to risks from PSM management, the focus is put on the 
media policies regulating the appointment and dismissal procedures for PSM management 
boards, and the analysis of how, if at all, these policies in practice safeguard the political 
independence of the respective PSM.  
The findings of this analysis allow mapping the state of play of the political 
independence of PSM systems in EU countries, and contribute to identifying elements of 
PSM systems which are most at risk from political interference, and best practices of how 
these risks can be mitigated.  
 
Political Influence over PSM 
It is claimed that governments have always been partners to European PSM
2
 (Bardoel and 
dHaensen, 2008), although it should be acknowledged that the relationship between many 
governments and PSM was sometimes far from being a partnership. Rather, in many cases 
and over many decades governments of various EU countries have tried to exert political 
influence over PSM and its content, leading Papathanassopoulos (2007, p. 153) to conclude 
that “disputes over the independence of public broadcasting are general to the history of 
European media”. Indeed, Mungiu-Pippidi (2003, p. 40) noted writing in the early 2000s that 
the independence of PSM in Europe is still “unfinished business”, even in its Western parts. 
This paper follows Mungiu-Pippidi’s definition of the independence of the public service 
media according to which PSM’s independence from political influences is defined as the 
ability of “both managers and journalists to run public service television and its programs as 
they see fit and without government interference” (2003, p. 34).  
Despite the fact that PSM in almost all EU Member States face a range of challenges, 
the most problematic systems from the viewpoint of their political independence appear to be 
those in Southern and Central Eastern Europe. Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) famous analysis 
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of Western media systems characterised Southern European media systems as those with a 
history of strong state interventions in media, particularly in regards to public service media, 
and clientelistic relationships between the political and journalistic elites. Although their 
analysis did not capture countries of Central Eastern Europe, some scholars argue that the 
same patterns of clientelism and state interventions are observable in some European post-
communist countries (Jakubowicz, 2008; Peruško, 2013; Splichal, 1995).  
It is argued that the appointments of the PSM boards in the countries of the Central 
Eastern Europe are one of the most common techniques of retaining control over public 
media (Jakubowicz, 2008), since “political groups both on the right and the left of the 
political spectrum share a common conception of the media as an instrument of political 
power, and public service television in particular as the instrument of political power” 
(Mungiu-Pippidi, 2003, p. 43). European post-communist countries are not the only ones 
historically seen as struggling with the independence of PSM, since South European societies 
have been (in)famous for their control over PSM through appointments as well. 
Appointments to the PSM boards based on partisan political criteria were common in 
countries such as Spain and Greece for decades, and they were also seen as a mechanism of a 
clientelistic society since they were used for returning favours by political elites to their 
supporters (Papatheodorou and Machin, 2003). It should be added that these types of 
appointments not only diminish the political independence of the PSM, but they can also be 
problematic for the functioning of the PSM. Where politically appointed members do not 
have sufficient skills and knowledge to make well-informed decisions from which the PSM 
would benefit, these deficiencies of the management structures may create further problems 
for this media. Overall, it is often suggested that the PSM systems in the Central Eastern and 
Southern Europe share many similarities (Jakubowicz, 2008; Peruško, 2013; Splichal, 1995). 
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However, rare studies engage in comparative analysis of these PSM systems, and particularly 
their political independence.  
The most recent attempt to compare PSM systems and examine their political 
independence was Media Pluralism Monitor 2014 project (MPM2014) which examined the 
risks for political independence of PSM across nine EU countries (Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Denmark, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, and United Kingdom). The MPM2014 
examined both the legal framework in which PSM operate, and the extent to which the 
legislation is implemented and in practice ensures PSM’s independence (Brogi and Dobreva, 
2015). It was found that Hungary and Italy are at high risk from political interference through 
appointment procedures to PSM boards, while Hungary was also declared as being at high 
risk from political control through the ways in which their PSM was funded, alongside 
Estonia and Greece (Brogi and Dobreva, 2015). 
The MPM2014 findings were in line with expectations based on the European Media 
Systems Survey (2010). This survey asked experts in European media questions about their 
countries’ media systems, with one of the questions being about the level of political 
independence of the PSM. Experts’ evaluations revealed that the PSM in Nordic countries 
(Norway, Denmark, Finland, Sweden) are seen as most independent from political influences, 
while those in Southern and Central Eastern Europe were declared least independent (of the 
EU countries lowest independence has been estimated in Italy, Malta, Romania and 
Slovakia). It should be noted that these findings primarily revealed the perception of PSM’s 
independence, rather than their actual independence, since the answers were based on 
experts’ evaluations. However, both MPM2014 and the European Media Systems survey 
show that the old practices of political elites trying to exert influence over the PSM in South 
and Central Eastern Europe are far from being the matters of the past. They also point to the 
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fact that these issues should be regularly monitored in order for the public and stakeholders to 
be aware of the challenges and risks associated with the PSM.  
 
What to monitor? 
The Council of Europe’s Recommendation to Member States on public service media 
governance (2012) outlines steps which should be taken for strengthening PSM’s 
independence in Europe, primarily focusing on the development of appropriate funding 
processes and appointment procedures for the PSM board(s). Indeed, PSM funding and 
appointment procedures to their board(s) are those mechanisms which are most frequently 
described as most important for securing political independence of a PSM (Bardoel and 
dHaensen, 2008; Benson and Powers, 2011; Hanretty, 2009; Papatheodorou and Machin, 
2003), and are hence among the most important ones to regularly monitor. 
The way in which PSM is funded is, according to Bardoel and dHaensen (2008, p. 
349), the key issue related to the PSM’s political independence, and it has also been 
identified as important for securing political independence by the European Parliament. In its 
resolution on public service broadcasting in the digital era, European parliament (2010) 
recommended to EU members states to “provide appropriate, proportionate and stable 
funding for public service media so as to enable them to fulfil their remit, guarantee political 
and economic independence”. Most authors agree that the best way to fund PSM in such a 
way as to ensure its independence from the state, but also retain a stable revenue of income, 
is through the system of licence fees (Bardoel and dHaensen, 2008; Benson and Powers, 
2011; Berg and Lund, 2012; Klimkiewicz, 2015). However, it should be noted that the state 
may have an influence even on the licence fee funded PSM, since it is usually the state which 
decides on the level of the licence fee. In order to minimise this potential risk, The Council of 
Europe (2012) recommends, among other things, that the state needs to ensure that the set 
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level of financing is adequate to meet PSM’s needs and that PSM should participate in the 
decision-making about the level of financing. In other words, the state shouldn’t be able to 
decide on the level of licence fee without consultations and taking into account the financial 
needs of the PSM. On the other side of the spectrum are usually direct state grants to the 
PSM, which are often seen as tools through which the state can try to influence the PSM 
(Berg and Lund, 2012; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2003; Klimkiewicz, 2015). As Papathanassopoulos 
(2007) argues, even if the state does not try, or succeed, in exerting pressure over the PSM 
through providing direct grants, PSM can still be harmed by this type of funding since it can 
affect the perception of their independence in the eyes of the public. Indeed, there is evidence 
to suggest that PSM’s political independence is correlated with the trust in PSM, so the more 
the state is able to influence the PSM, the less trust in its content citizens have (Connolly and 
Hargreaves Heap, 2007). In light of this, the fact that the average percentage of state grants in 
overall financing increased from 10 to 13.3% among EBU public service members from 2011 
to 2012 (Klimkiewicz, 2015), might be a cause for concern, or at least a call for better 
monitoring of the public service media’s political independence. 
The other instrument through which the state may be able to control the PSM 
concerns the appointment of its governing body(ies). Council of Europe (2012) holds that it is 
“legitimate for the State to be involved in the appointment of the highest supervisory or 
decision-making authority within the public service media”. However, it also emphasises that 
the appointment processes should be designed in such a way as to guarantee independence of 
the PSM from the State. For example, legislation should clearly outline the appointment and 
dismissal procedures, contain elements which would minimise state’s ability to appoint 
partisan members, appointments should be made for a specified term, situations in which 
members can be dismissed should be limited and legally defined etc. In addition, it is 
suggested that that appointments made for a longer period of time might increase PSM’s 
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independence since board members may be less inclined to promote preferences of those that 
appointed them (Hanretty, 2009). Also, it is speculated that involvement of a larger number 
of political actors in the appointment process may lead to greater independence since “the 
match between any appointing actor and the appointed person will be looser” (Hanretty, 
2009, p. 84). To illustrate, it is expected that the PSM would be more independent if the 
parliament decides on its appointments, rather than the government. Of course, this may not 
always be the case, since in parliamentary democracies, which are many EU countries, the 
government usually has the majority in the parliament. For example, Mungiu-Pippidi (2003) 
noted that the legislative changes which transferred the competence over appointments of the 
PSM boards from governments to parliaments in the Central Eastern Europe in 1990s did 
little to decrease political influence over the PSM.  
In sum, comparative research into political independence of European PSM is limited, 
and rare existing studies point to the fact that many PSM systems in EU Member States are 
still vulnerable to political influences. This paper aims to contribute to the monitoring of 
PSM’s political independence by establishing risks for political independence of PSM across 
EU Member States. Accordingly, the main research question which this paper aims to answer 
is: At what kinds of risks from the influences of the state are public service media in the 
European Union? 
 
Research Design 
This paper reports on the findings from the Media Pluralism Monitor 2015
3
, a study 
consequent to that mentioned earlier (MPM2014), in which the risks for political 
independence of the PSM have been examined in the 19 EU countries not tested in the 2014 
project. Particularly, the paper focuses on the part of the project whose aim was to identify 
media policies related to safeguarding political independence of public service media. This 
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was done by examining legal safeguards for guaranteeing independence of public service 
media’s management and its funding mechanisms, but also by evaluating the extent to which 
these legal safeguards are actually implemented and the PSM is independent in practice.  
The analysis was conducted in 19 Member States of the EU (Austria, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden) through a 
questionnaire-based method. The countries from the sample represent old and new Member 
States (e.g. the sample includes founding countries Germany, Luxembourg and Netherlands, 
and the newest Member State Croatia), from different geographic regions of Europe, and with 
diverse media systems. Given the focus of this study, it might be tempting to draw upon 
Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) typology, which classifies Western European media systems in 
three models: liberal (North Atlantic), democratic corporatist (North/Central Europe), and 
polarised pluralist (Southern Europe/Mediterranean model). However, their classification 
does not capture European post-communist countries, so it does not offer a comprehensive 
categorisation for the purpose of this study. In addition, scholars have warned that European 
post-communist countries’ media systems are too diverse to be lumped together in one 
category/model (Sparks, 1998; Jakubowicz and Sükösd, 2008). Given this, this article will 
primarily rely on the geographical clustering most common in communication studies, with 
Austria, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Sweden being considered 
as Northwest Europe; Cyprus, Malta, Portugal and Spain as Southern Europe; and Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia as Central 
Eastern Europe
4
 (see, for example European Commission, 2009).  
Local teams
5
 from each of the examined countries evaluated media policy on the 
appointment procedures for management and board functions in the PSM, and mechanisms of 
providing funding to it by the state. The evaluations of the actual independence of the PSM 
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needed to be supported by evidence. Furthermore, some of these indicators have also been 
subjected to the group of experts’ revision. This procedure entailed a number of national 
experts in media freedom reviewing local teams’ evaluations, and providing alternative 
evaluations supported by evidence when appropriate. In situations where any of the national 
experts disagreed with the evaluation of the country team, the team needed to amend their 
answer or explain why the disagreement was not taken into account in providing the final 
answer (for more details about project’s methodology see Brogi et al., 2016). 
The decision to focus on the PSM management and funding was based on the existing 
literature and previous studies which outlined these two mechanisms as the most important 
for securing political independence. In line with the ideas put forward by Hanretty
6
 (2009) 
and in line with the MPM2014 study, indicators to assess the independence were divided into 
de iure, assessing legal framework, and de facto, aiming to assess the extent to which PSM is 
independent in practice
7
. De iure/legal questions had the option to be answered as yes or no, 
while de facto/practice questions were coded as low, medium, or high risk. Each answer was 
calibrated on a scale from 0 to 1, with 0 describing a situation of low risk, and 1 situation of 
high risk. Specifically, each “yes” and “low risk” answer were coded as 0, “medium risk” as 
0.5, while “no” and “high risk” answers were coded as 1. Two other answer options were 
offered for each question – not applicable and no data. Answers coded as “not applicable” 
were excluded from the analysis. Each “no data” answer had to be accompanied by a local 
team’s comment in which the team evaluated whether or not the lack of data should be seen 
as problematic within the national context. Two independent coders then recoded the “no 
data” answer as showing either low or high risk according to a strict set of criteria. For each 
of the two examined mechanisms (management and funding) the value of the de iure and de 
facto independence was calculated as the mean of all its indicators, the value of the 
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mechanism is the mean of its de iure and de facto elements, and the final risk for the 
independence of the PSM is measured as the mean of the two mechanisms.  
 
 [Table 1 near here] 
 
It should be emphasised that this is a risk-based exercise in which the final score, 
which is presented as a percentage on a scale from 0 to 100, represents the degree of risk for a 
PSM’s political independence. This means that a high risk does not necessarily mean that a 
PSM is not independent, but that it is vulnerable to political influences. Accordingly, a low 
risk assessment does not mean that a PSM is not under political influence, but rather that 
some appropriate safeguards of its political independence exist. Finally, scores between 0 and 
33% are considered low risk, 34 to 66% medium risk, while those between 67 and 100% high 
risk. 
 
Findings and Discussion 
The main finding of this study is that public service media in some Member States of the EU 
are still at high risk from political influences, and that overall, there are many differences 
among EU states in the type of risk for political independence, but also its extent. This study 
reinforces findings from previous studies in the sense that North Western European PSM 
systems seem to be at less risk from political influences, than those in Southern and Central 
Eastern Europe. 
Specifically, the analysis showed that five EU countries have PSM with high risk for 
political independence (Cyprus, Malta, Romania, Slovenia, and Spain), six countries are at 
medium risk (Austria, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia), while in eight 
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countries the risk for PSM independence is low (Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden). 
In spite of the fact that Southern and Central Eastern European countries in general 
score medium and high risk, and North Western European countries low risk, there are 
notable exceptions to this. Three out of four Southern European countries are evaluated as at 
high risk from political influences on PSM, which can be seen as expected according to the 
Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) characterisation of the Mediterranean countries as those with a 
strong role of the state in the media system. However, Portugal is an example of a Southern 
European country which was assessed by the local team as being at low risk from political 
interference in the PSM. More specifically, the case of Portugal shows that the risk for the 
political independence of the PSM can be seen as decreased with the introduction of 
appropriate legislation. In particular, Portugal introduced several novelties in the legal 
framework related to the PSM over the past few years which the local team evaluated as 
contributing to the decrease of the state’s possibilities of influence. For example, in 2014 
Independent general council, tasked with appointing PSM board members according to a set 
of clear, objective and transparent criteria, was established to act as a buffer between the state 
and the PSM. However, it remains to be seen how effective this new legislation will be in 
safeguarding PSM’s political independence. Also, direct grants to the PSM were abolished in 
2013 in Portugal, what adds to the low risk assessment. If the state is indeed aiming to 
decrease its powers in Portugal’s media system, this points to interesting developments in 
what is considered the Mediterranean media system model (Hallin and Mancini, 2004).   
Furthermore, while the PSM of the majority of Central Eastern European Member 
States are assessed as being at medium and high risk, Czech Republic is an example of a 
country in this cluster which scores low risk, although at its higher end. In particular, this is 
due to the fact that there is no body which would monitor the implementation of a well-
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established legislation concerning appointment procedures, and local team also warned that 
there have been certain attempts of political interference with the appointments in the past 
couple of years. However, the majority of funding for the PSM comes from the licence fee 
which is enumerated in the law and can only be amended by the parliament, what creates a 
low risk situation for PSM funding. Croatian local team has also assessed the risks for 
political independence of their PSM in 2015 as being at low risk. However, alarm bells 
started ringing in early 2016, as in Poland, when the PSM’s Director General was dismissed 
following the change of the ruling coalition. European Broadcasting Union reacted by urging 
Croatian government to ensure political independence of its PSM (EBU News, 2016). These 
recent developments go to show that the state of Central Eastern European PSM’s political 
independence is far from settled. Rather, it seems to be in constant flux.  
Furthermore, in spite of the fact that the vast majority of Central Eastern European 
countries have been assessed as being at medium or high risk, there are significant 
differences within this cluster in PSM’s risk assessments. Specifically, two CEE countries 
score low risk, four medium, and two high risk. This information gives credit to claims of 
media scholars who argue that European post-communist countries should not be uncritically 
ascribed to the same media system model (Sparks, 1998; Jakubowicz and Sükösd, 2008), 
since there are notable differences between these countries in the ways in which political 
elites interact with the media system.  
Finally, emphasis should be put on the case of Ireland, whose PSM is assessed as at 
medium risk from political influences, while the majority of North Western Member States 
score low risk.Ireland’s medium risk assessment is primarily due to the fact that the state has 
great influence over the appointments and dismissals of the PSM board members. This, as in 
the Portuguese case, shows how some countries seem to be shifting from media system 
clusters they were historically assigned to. Hallin and Mancini (2004) placed Ireland in the 
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liberal model, characterised by limited state intervention in the media system. However, Irish 
local team warns in 2015 that the state is very much interested in influencing the Irish PSM.  
 
Risks from Management 
The analysis of the legislation concerning appointments to the PSM boards showed that in 
five out of 19 examined countries (Cyprus, Ireland, Malta, Slovenia, and Spain) the law does 
not provide fair, objective, and transparent appointment procedures of the PSM board, which 
would minimise state’s ability to exert influence. Furthermore, six out of 14 countries which 
do have good legislation do not have a body which would monitor its implementation 
(Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Netherlands, Romania, and Slovakia), so it may be much 
easier to interfere with the law if there is no institution which oversees it and is in control of 
its implementation. In addition, of the countries that have appropriate legal safeguards and 
bodies monitoring their implementation, in one case this body is not granted effective powers 
which would give it legitimacy and ability to effectively supervise implementation of the law 
(this is the case in Poland). In sum, only seven out of 19 studied PSM systems have 
appropriate legal safeguards which might help them in avoiding political influence via 
appointment procedures (these are Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, and Sweden).  
However, as noted by Hanretty (2009), legal safeguards do not always guarantee 
independence in practice, what is shown by this research as well. In particular, three out of 
seven countries with appropriate legal safeguards have some problems in the implementation 
of these laws, with evidence of political actors trying to influence management boards of the 
PSM (Finland, Latvia, Sweden). Overall, only four countries in the sample have appropriate 
laws which are well implemented and are seen to be securing the independence of the PSM 
management (Germany, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal). Consequently, six countries score 
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high risk for the independence of the PSM management (Cyprus, Ireland, Malta, Poland, 
Slovenia, and Spain), four score medium (Austria, Czech Republic, Romania, and Slovakia), 
and nine are assessed as at low risk from political influence over PSM management boards 
(Croatia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and 
Sweden). 
 
Risks from Funding 
Examination of the legislation concerned with the funding of PSM revealed that six out of 19 
studied countries do not have media law prescribing transparent and objective procedures on 
determining the amount of money to be granted to PSM (Austria, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, and Slovenia). Furthermore, five out of 13 countries that do have appropriate legal 
provisions are evaluated as at risk due to the ways in which governments are able to decide 
the amount of money to be granted to the PSM (Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia, and 
Spain). In our sample, half of examined countries (n=9) have PSM that receives substantial 
direct state grants, which is considered to represent a risk to its independence, i.e. grants 
could be used as a point of pressure from the state. Overall, when it comes to risks from the 
PSM funding, five EU countries score high risk (Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and 
Slovenia), five score medium risk (Austria, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia, and Spain), and 
half of all examined countries are at low risk from political influences from the ways in 
which the PSM is funded (see table 2 for details).  
 
[Table 2 near here] 
 
It is interesting to note that the majority of countries either score low risk for both 
mechanisms (management and funding), or medium or high risk. To illustrate, PSM in 
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Cyprus, Slovenia, Romania, Spain, Malta, Austria and Slovakia are at medium or high risk 
from both management and funding mechanisms, while Croatia, Germany, Portugal, Sweden, 
Finland and Netherlands have low risk assessments for both mechanisms. Hence, it could be 
speculated that countries with one type of risk are more likely to be at another type of risk for 
political independence.  
In this context it is also interesting to more closely examine the cases in which there is 
little risk from one type of influence, but significant risk from another type. Baltic countries 
Latvia and Lithuania are in such a situation. Both countries score high risk from funding, but 
low risk from management. Low risks from the political influence via appointments to PSM 
board are based on the fact that these countries have been assessed by local teams as having 
well implemented laws which provide fair, objective and transparent appointment procedures 
for management and board functions in PSM. For example, board members of the Latvia’s 
PSM are selected in line with the procedures of an open competition, and appointed and 
dismissed by the National Electronic Mass Media Council, according to the Electronic Mass 
Media Law passed in 2010. On the other hand, when it comes to PSM funding, in both 
countries the PSM is primarily funded via state grants. Information about the 2015 budget 
reveals that more than 70% of Latvia’s PSM is funded by the state, while following the ban 
of advertising on Lithuanian PSM which came into force in 2015, Lithuania’s PSM became 
fully funded by the state. Pečiulis (2010, p. 83) notes that funding schemes for the Lithuania’s 
PSM have been discussed for over two decades, but that “there was an impression that 
Lithuanian politicians realistically did not want the subscription fee to be introduced” in order 
to retain their ability to exert political influence over it. There were several recommendations 
of how to improve the political independence and increase stability of revenue through 
various funding models, but none of them were implemented (2010). Similar developments 
were observed in Latvia where the Parliamentary committees did not support 
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recommendations on funding from the working group consisting of media experts (Brikše, 
2010). Brikše (2010, p. 74) sums up the developments in Latvia by saying that “there has 
been an entire lack of political readiness to identify a financing procedure that would ensure 
the independence of PSM, as well as sufficient resources to ensure high-quality content”. 
These examples show how although one mechanism for ensuring political independence may 
be well defined and implemented, this does not necessarily mean that the PSM is not at risk 
from political influence since political elites may be able to exert pressure via another type of 
mechanism.  
 
Implications 
One of the main reasons why political independence of the PSM is considered 
important is because it is believed that PSM under political influence might produce content 
which is biased in favour of the government and parties that support it. This would mean that 
the PSM does not represent all political viewpoints in a society in a fair and balanced way. 
Consequently, it is feared that such content may reduce voters’ ability to make rational and 
well-informed decisions. In the words of Mona Krewel, “[t]he automony of PSM is an 
elementary precondition for pluralistic media coverage and hence for a functioning 
democracy” (2015, p. 126). However, it is wrong to assume that PSM is biased in its 
reporting just because it is under political influence, or that this has any kind of effect on 
voters.  
In order to examine whether there is any kind of relationship between the risks for 
political independence of PSM and the way in which it reports politics, the findings of this 
analysis are compared with the data about the extent to which PSM reporting in each 
examined country is politically biased. Specifically, the indicator assessing the bias in PSM 
reporting was based on the question from the Media Pluralism Monitor 2015 which asked: “Is 
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there evidence to suggest that audiovisual coverage of the electoral campaign on PSM offers 
proportional and non-biased representation of the different groups of political actors?” In 
other words, local teams were asked to evaluate, based on available evidence (content 
analysis of PSM reports, NGO reports, regulator’s reports etc.), the extent to which PSM’s 
electoral reporting is biased. Answers were calibrated on a scale from 0 to 1 as was described 
previously (i.e. no evidence of bias was given a score of 0/0%, some evidence of bias 
0.5/50%, and if there was evidence that different groups of political actors are represented in 
a biased and non-proportional, clearly favouring some political actors over others, a score of 
1/100% was given).  
The comparison of risks for PSM’s political independence and the political bias in its 
electoral reporting shows that certain relationships between risks from political influence and 
biased reporting are visible. For example, those public service media which have biased 
content are somewhat probable to also be at medium or high risk from political interference, 
since four out of five PSM which have biased content are also at risk from political 
interference. On the other hand, only one out of eight PSM which is assessed as at low risk 
for political independence has some bias in its reporting.  
 
[Figure 1 near here] 
 
However, what Figure 1 also reveals is that there are many countries in which PSM is 
at a medium or high risk from political influence, but its content remains balanced and 
unbiased. Specifically, this is the case in seven out of 11 Member States whose PSM is 
assessed as at medium or high risk (Austria, Cyprus, Ireland, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, and 
Romania). One reason for this may be the fact that all examined countries have a media law 
which imposes rules aiming at fair, balanced and impartial representation of political 
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viewpoints in news and informative programmes on PSM channels and services (Brogi et al. 
2016). Furthermore, only two countries in the sample do not have specific legal provisions 
which would impose rules aiming at guaranteeing access to airtime on PSM channels and 
services for political actors during election campaigns, Austria and Finland, however in 
Finland the PSM’s Administrative council sets guidelines to ensure balanced reporting prior 
to each elections (Brogi et al., 2016). Nord (2015) notes that there is regulation ensuring 
access to PSM content during electoral campaigns also in other EU countries which have not 
been captured by the sample used for analysis in this paper. This all points to the fact that 
although the state may be able to exert some pressure over the PSM, its content can be 
safeguarded from political influence by regulation which aims to ensure pluralism in PSM 
reporting. 
 
Conclusions 
The study reported in this paper was set out to examine risks for political independence of the 
EU Member States’ public service media. The data to perform this analysis was collected 
through the Media Pluralism Monitor 2015 project in which local teams across 19 EU 
countries answered a series of questions about national media policies and their 
implementation, with some of the evaluations of the quality of implementation being 
reviewed by a group of national media experts.  
It should be emphasized again that the presented study is a risk analysis, hence it does 
not reveal whether or not PSM actually is under political influence, and what kind of 
consequences this has on its functioning, content and audience reception. This can, of course, 
be considered as a limitation of the project, but also a venue for future research. Furthermore, 
it should be acknowledged that the results might be different if other mechanisms through 
which the state can influence the PSM have been included (e.g. information about adequacy 
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of budget, accountability to state, PSM board’s decision practice, board members’ term of 
office), and if different variables have been used for establishing risks from management and 
funding. However, it was necessary to focus on main mechanisms of exerting pressure, and a 
limited number of variables assessing them, due to the extensiveness of project’s comparative 
dimension and its other constraints (time, resources).   
The findings of this study reinforce some previous research, but also indicate that 
some ideas about the European media systems should perhaps be rethought. Firstly, trends 
detected by this study point to the conclusion that public service media in countries of North 
Western Europe are in general at less risk from political influence, than those in Central 
Eastern and Southern Europe(with some notable exceptions), as has been established in 
previous comparative studies (Brogi and Dobreva, 2015; European Media Systems Survey 
2010). This suggests that many PSM systems in Southern and Central Eastern Europe 
continue to be vulnerable to political influence, what can decrease the quality of their content 
and the trust that citizens have in them.  
However, what this study also revealed is that there are many differences in the levels 
of risk, and their type, among countries characterised as pertaining to the Central Eastern 
European cluster. This reinforces arguments of scholars who claim that European post-
communist systems are varied (Sparks, 1998; Jakubowicz and Sükösd, 2008), and their 
categorisations should perhaps be rethought.  
Secondly, looking at the risks associated with the PSM funding and PSM 
management, the analysis reveals the diversity of media policies among EU Member States 
and risks associated to these policies and their implementation. The results show that in five 
out of 19 analysed countries media policies do not provide fair, objective and transparent 
appointment procedures for management and board functions in PSM, which would minimise 
state’s ability to interfere. Furthermore, more than half of the countries that considered 
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national media policy on appointment procedures to be well defined in safeguarding PSM’s 
independence, declared some degree of risk in the implementation of this policy, pointing to 
situations in which the government or other political groupings have in the past few years 
tried to interfere with the appointment processes. Also, results show that there are large 
differences in the mechanisms of funding PSM, and consequently in the ability of the state to 
interfere in the PSM. In some EU countries PSM is completely funded from the state budget 
(e.g. Finland, Luxembourg), while in some others the governments do not directly participate 
in its funding (e.g. Sweden, Austria).  
Interestingly, it does not appear that PSM systems that score higher risk from political 
interference necessarily have biased content. The comparison of risks for PSM’s political 
independence and bias in their content revealed no significant correlation. It has been 
suggested that a reason for this may lie in national media legislations which are aimed at 
securing objective, unbiased and proportional representation of political views on public 
service media. 
The case of Portugal showed that the introduction of appropriate legislation and 
changes in funding mechanisms towards those which minimise state’s ability to exert 
pressure through providing funds can be seen as decreasing the risks from political influence, 
although it remains to be seen how successful the new legislation will be in safeguarding 
PSM’s independence. On the other hand, the new legislation in Poland based on which the 
government established direct control over the PSM management boards, andrecent 
developments in Croatia, where the PSM’s Director General was dismissed quickly after the 
right-wing coalition came to power at the end of 2015, keep raising concerns about European 
public media’s political independence. This all points to the fact that regular monitoring of 
the risks for political independence of the PSM is beneficial since it allows periodical 
mapping of the state of play of risks for political independence of PSM and serves as a 
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measure of early warning for systems in which vulnerabilities are detected. Further research 
in a form of regular monitoring is hence considered essential. 
Finally, establishing why the similarities and differences in EU Member States’ media 
policies concerned with PSM’s political independence are as they arewas outside of the scope 
of this study. However, it would be interesting if future research could address this question 
and shed more light on the contextual factors leading or contributing to different risk 
assessments of political independence of European Union Member States’ public service 
media.  
 
  
23 
 
References 
 
Bardoel, J. & dHaenens, L. (2008) Reinventing public service broadcasting in Europe: 
prospects, promises and problems. Media, Culture and Society. 30 (3), 337-355. 
Benson. R. & Powers, M. (2011) Public media and political independence: Lessons for the 
Future of Journalism. Freepress. 
Berg, C. & Lund, A. (2012) Financing Public Service Broadcasting: A Comparative 
Perspective. Journal of Media Business Studies. 9 (1), 7-21. 
Brikše, I. (2010) Public Service Broadcasting in Latvia: Old images, new user needs and 
market pressure. Central European Journal of Communication. 3 (1), 67-79. 
Brogi, E., Ginsborg, L., Ostling, A., Parcu, PL., Šimunjak, M. (2016) Monitoring Media 
Pluralism in Europe – Testing and Implementation of the Media Pluralism Monitor 2015 – 
Policy Report. Centre for media pluralism and Media Freedom. European University 
Institute. 
Brogi, E. &Dobreva, A. (2015) Monitoring Media Pluralism in Europe - Testing and 
Implementation of the Media Pluralism Monitor 2014. Policy report. Centre for media 
pluralism and Media Freedom. European University Institute. 
Connolly, S. & Hargreaves Heap, S. (2007) Cross Country Differences in Trust in Television 
and the Governance of Public Broadcasters.Kyklos. 60 (1), 3–14. 
Council of Europe (2012) Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to Member States 
on public service media governance. CM/Rec(2012)1 
EBU News (2016) EBU urges Croatian government to ensure institutional independence of 
HRT. European Broadcasting Union.Accessed 10 June 2016. Retrieved from: 
http://www.ebu.ch/news/2016/02/ebu-urges-croatian-government-to 
24 
 
European Commission (2009) Media4Diversity: Taking the Pulse of Diversity in the 
media.Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
European Media Systems survey (2010) Accessed 10 November 2015. Retrieved from: 
http://www.mediasystemsineurope.org/results.htm 
European Parliament (2010) Resolution of 25 November 2010 on public service broadcasting 
in the digital era: the future of the dual system (2010/2028(INI)) 
Hallin, D. C. and Mancini, P. 2004. Comparing Media Systems.Three Models of Media and 
Politics. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.  
Hanretty, C. (2009) Explaning the De Facto Independence of Public Broadcasters. British 
Journal of Political Science.40 (1), 75-89. 
Jakubowicz, K. (2008) Finding the Right Place on the Map: Prospects for Public Service 
Broadcasting in Post-Communist Countries. In Jakubowicz, K. &Sükösd, M. Finding the 
Right Place on the Map: Central and Eastern European Media Change in a Global 
Perspective(pp. 101-124).Bristol UK, Chicago USA, Intellect. 
Jakubowicz, K., &Sükösd, M. (2008).Twelve concepts regarding media system evolution and 
democratization in post-communist societies.In Jakubowicz, K. &Sükösd, M. Finding the 
Right Place on the Map: Central and Eastern European Media Change in a Global 
Perspective (pp. 9-40).Bristol UK, Chicago USA, Intellect. 
Klimkiewicz, B. (2015) Between Autonomy and Dependency: Funding Mechanisms of 
Public Service Media in Selected European Countries. In Arriaza Ibarra, K., Nowak, E. and 
Kuhn, R. (Eds.).Public Service Media in Europe: A Comparative Approach (pp. 111-125) 
London, New York: Routledge,  
Krewel, M. (2015) Autonomy and Regulatory Frameworks of Public Service Media: 
Diverging Scenarios in a Europe of Different Levels. In Arriaza Ibarra, K., Nowak, E. and 
25 
 
Kuhn, R. (Eds) Public Service Media in Europe: A Comparative Approach. (pp. 126-146) 
London, New York: Routledge,. 
Mijatović, D. (2016) DunjaMijatović: Why quality public service media has not caught on in 
transition societies. Index on Censorship.Accessed 10 June 2016. Retrieved from: 
https://www.indexoncensorship.org/2016/06/dunja-mijatovic/ 
Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2003) From State to Public Service: The Failed Reform of State 
Television in Central Eastern Europe. Central European University, Centre for Policy 
Studies. Open Society Institute.  
Nord, L.W. (2015) Why is Public Service Media Content As It Is? A Comparison of 
Principles and Practices in Six EU Countries. In Arriaza Ibarra, K., Nowak, E. and Kuhn, R. 
(Eds.) Public Service Media in Europe: A Comparative Approach. (pp. 170-188) London, 
New York: Routledge. 
Papathanassopoulos, S. (2007) Financing public service broadcasters in the new era. In de 
Bens, E. Media between culture and commerce. Bristol UK, Chicago USA: Intellect. 
Papatheodorou, F. and Machin, D.(2003) The Umbilical Cord That Was Never Cut: The 
Post-Dictatorial Intimacy between the Political Elite and the Mass Media in Greece and 
Spain. European Journal of Communication.18 ( 1), 31-54. 
Pečiulis, Ž. (2010) Mission (im)possible. The case of Lithuanian Public Service 
Broadcasting.Central European Journal of Communication. 3 (1), pp. 81-94. 
Peruško, Z. (2013) Komparativnaanalizapostsocijalističkihmedijskihsustava.Političkamisao. 
50 (2), 38-59. 
Sparks, C. (with A. Reading) 1998.Communism, Capitalism and the Mass 
Media.London,Sage.  
Splichal, S. (1995) Media Beyond Socialism: Theory and Practice in East-Central Europe. 
Boulder: Westview Press.  
26 
 
Table 1: Index of risk for PSM independence  
 
Management –  
de iure/legal 
Management –  
de facto/practice 
Funding –  
de iure/legal 
Funding –  
de facto/ practice 
1. Does the law (e.g. 
media law, 
administrative law, 
company law, labour 
law, conventions 
between PSM and the 
government) provide 
fair, objective and 
transparent appointment 
procedures for 
management and board 
functions in PSM?  
 
2. Is there an 
administrative or 
judicial body tasked to 
actively monitor the 
compliance with these 
rules and/or hearing 
complaints? 
 
3. Does the law grant 
that body effective 
sanctioning/enforcement 
powers in order to 
impose proportionate 
remedies in case of 
noncompliance with the 
rules?  
4. Do these 
appointment 
procedures 
guarantee the 
independence of 
PSM boards and 
management from 
government and/or a 
single political 
group?  
 
5. Are the legal 
safeguards for 
appointment and 
dismissal procedures 
for management and 
board functions in 
PSM implemented 
in practice?  
1. Does media law 
prescribes 
transparent and 
objective 
procedures on 
determining the 
amount of money to 
be granted to PSM?  
2. How would you 
describe the 
mechanism of 
providing financing 
to the PSM by the 
government?  
 
3. What is the 
percentage of direct 
government 
financing for the 
PSM?  
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Table 2: Risks per mechanism and overall risk for political independence of the PSM 
  
 Management risk in % Funding risk in % overall PSM risk in % 
Austria 63 50 57 
Croatia 25 0 13 
Cyprus 100 100 100 
Czech Republic 50 6 28 
Finland 25 25 25 
Germany 0 0 0 
Ireland 100 13 57 
Latvia 13 100 57 
Lithuania 0 100 50 
Luxembourg 0 38 19 
Malta 100 44 72 
Netherlands 25 25 25 
Poland 67 0 34 
Portugal 0 0 0 
Romania 63 88 76 
Slovakia 38 38 38 
Slovenia 100 94 97 
Spain 100 50 75 
Sweden 13 0 7 
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Figure 1: Relationship between risks for PSM political independence and the bias in PSM 
electoral reporting 
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1
 An earlier draft of this paper was accepted for publication in the Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies (RSCAS) Working Paper Series 
2
 In spite of the fact that almost all countries in the world have a PSM of some kind; it needs to be 
acknowledged that there are many differences between PSM systems. The focus of this paper is on the 
PSM systems in the EU. European PSM are characterised by the low cost of accessibility, high 
availability, promotion of diversity and pluralism, catering for minorities, and overall focus on 
political, cultural, and educational content (Bardoel and dHaensen, 2008; Papathanassopoulos, 2007), 
which is not how PSM necessarily functions in other parts of the world.  
3
 More details about the project are available here: http://monitor.cmpf.eui.eu/#. The data for 
MPM2015 was collected during June 2015, and hence captures the media policies and their 
implementation in this point in time. It should be noted that the changes in media law which affect 
PSM in Poland, which came into effect in 2016, as well as developments in Croatia, have not been 
captured by this study. The consequent monitor, Media Pluralism Monitor 2016, is aiming to assess 
these.  
4
 It should be noted that some countries could have been considered in a different cluster. For 
example, some studies place Croatia in Southern Europe (e.g. Peruško, 2013).  
5
 Local teams were affiliated with universities and research institutes, and consisted of media scholars 
who were invited by the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom to implement the MPM2015 
in their respective countries. For a detailed list of universities/institutes involved and local teams’ 
team leaders please consult Brogi et al. (2016) 
6
Hanretty (2009) was among the first ones to raise the question about the connection of the de jure 
independence, which can be measured by the examination of the legal framework in which a PSM 
operates, and its actual, de facto independence. He argues that legislation may not be completely clear 
or enforced, so examining the regulations does not necessarily tell us whether or not a PSM is actually 
independent in practice. In order to test the connection between the de jure and de facto independence, 
Hanretty created an index of de jure independence consisting of several indicators (including PSM 
funding, and appointment and dismissal procedures for its board) and examined its correlation with 
PSM’s de facto independence which was measured through a proxy based on the executive turnover. 
The results showed that well established legal framework which guarantees political independence of 
the PSM indeed ensures its independence, but only when the size of the market for news is taken into 
account. In other words, ‘assuming average press circulation, an increase from no legal protection to 
full legal protection would result in an increase from negligible to almost total de facto independence’ 
(2009, p. 88). 
7
 For questions’ descriptions and methods of measurement see Brogi et al. (2016) 
 
 
 
